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Normative multiagent systems provide agents with abilities to autonomously devise societies and or-
ganizations coordinating their behavior via social norms and laws. In this paper we study how agents
negotiate new social norms and when they accept them. We introduce a negotiation model based on
what we call the social delegation cycle, which explains the negotiation of new social norms from
agent desires in three steps. First individual agents or their representatives negotiate social goals, then
a social goal is negotiated in a social norm, and finally the social norm is accepted by the agents
when it leads to fulfilment of the desires the cycle started with. We characterize the allowed propos-
als during social goal negotiation as mergers of the individual agent desires, and we characterize the
allowed proposals during norm negotiation as both joint plans to achieve the social goal (obligations
associated with the norm) and the associated sanctions or rewards (a control system associated with
the norm). The norm is accepted when the norm is stable in the sense that agents will act according to
the norm, and effective in the sense that fulfilment of the norm leads to achievement of the agents’ de-
sires. We also compare norm negotiation with contract negotiation and negotiation of the distribution
of obligations.
1. Introduction
Social norms and laws can be used to guide the emergent behavior of multiagent systems.
Moreover, these norms guiding the emergent behavior of the system can also emerge them-
selves, leading to a challenge for models of normative multiagent systems. To deal with the
apparent recursion in the definition of the emergence of norms, we need a model making
it precise when and how norms can emerge. Since agents may have conflicting goals with
respect to the norms that emerge, they try to negotiate amongst each other which norm will
emerge. Moreover, we may say that a norm has emerged when it has been accepted by the
agents, as has been studied, for example, by Conte et al.14
The negotiation and acceptance of norms has to obey various principles. For example,
to accept a norm, an agent has to recognize it as a norm, the norm must contribute to the
goals or desires of the agent, and it must be obeyed by the other agents. Consequently, the
challenge for a model of norm negotiation is how to explain what it means, for example, to
recognize or to obey a norm. Moreover, there are additional challenges, for example how
1
May 26, 2006 11:24 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE sdc
2 Boella and van der Torre
new norms interact with existing ones.
In this paper we study norm emergence and acceptance using a model of norm negoti-
ation. It is based on a distinction between social goal negotiation and the negotiation of the
obligations with their control system. Roughly, the social goals are the potential benefits
of the new norm for the agents, and the obligations are the potential costs of the new norm
for the agents in the sense that agents risk being sanctioned if they do not respect the norm.
Moreover, in particular when representatives of the agents negotiate the social goals and
norms, the agents still have to accept the negotiated norms.14 The norm is accepted when
the norm is stable in the sense that agents will act according to the norm, and effective
in the sense that fulfilment of the norm leads to achievement of the agents’ desires – i.e.,
when the benefits outweigh the costs. Summarizing, norm negotiation can be described by
the so-called social delegation cycle visualized in Figure 1.
social goal
   goal 
negotiation
  norm 
negotiation
desires
 agent norm
   norm
acceptance
Fig. 1. ∆: the social delegation cycle.
The conceptual model we use to study and formalize the social delegation cycle is
based on a formal characterization of normative multiagent systems we have developed
in several other papers.7,8 This characterization combines a game-theoretic approach with
cognitive agents, rule based systems and input/output logics. The advantage given by this
formal system is that it combines a qualitative theory of agent decision-making with a
detailed ontology of normative systems. The decision making is used to explain how agents
negotiate goals and norms, and when they accept norms.
Within the model of normative multiagent systems, we have to choose a protocol for
negotiation. Since we are not interested in the intricacies of negotiation itself, but in the
relation among goal negotiation, norm negotiation and acceptance, we choose a relatively
simple abstract turn-taking model which we can use for both negotiation steps. The central
issue in such an abstract negotiation model is the definition of an allowed proposal for a
social goal or for a norm, for which we define additional conditions.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give an introduction to normative
multiagent systems, and in Section 3 we discuss an abstract model of the social delegation
cycle. In Section 4 we define the conceptual model in which we study and formalize the
social delegation cycle, and in Section 5 we define our version of the negotiation protocol
and the logic of rules. In Section 6 we formalize goal negotiation, in Section 7 we formalize
norm negotiation, and in Section 8 we formalize the acceptance relation.
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2. Normative multiagent systems
Jones and Carmo21 define a normative system as “Sets of agents whose interactions are
norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not behave.
[...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior may at times devi-
ate from the id eal, i.e., that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur.” Since
the agents’ control over the norms is not explicit here, we use the following definition.
A normative multiagent system is a multiagent system together with nor-
mative systems in which agents can decide whether to follow the explic-
itly represented norms, and the normative systems specify how and in
which extent the agents can modify the norms.9
Note that this definition makes no presumptions about the internal architecture of an agent
or of the way norms find their expression in agent’s behavior.
Since norms are explicitly represented, according to our definition of a normative mul-
tiagent system, the question should be raised how norms are represented. Norms can be
interpreted as a special kind of constraint, and represented depending on the domain in
which they occur. However, the representation of norms by domain dependent constraints
runs into the question what happens when norms are violated. Not all agents behave ac-
cording to the norm, and the system has to deal with it. In other words, norms are not hard
constraints, but soft constraints. For example, the system may sanction violations or reward
good behavior. Thus, the normative system has to monitor the behavior of agents and en-
force the sanctions. Also, when norms are represented as domain dependent constraints,
the question will be raised how to represent permissive norms, and how they relate to obli-
gations. Whereas obligations and prohibitions can be represented as constraints, this does
not seem to hold for permissions. For example, how to represent the permission to access
a resource under an access control system? Finally, when norms are represented as domain
dependent constraints, the question can be raised how norms evolve.
We therefore believe that norms should be represented as a domain independent theory.
For example, deontic logic40,38,37,25,26,27 studies logical relations among obligations and
permissions, and more in particular violations and contrary-to-duty obligations, permis-
sions and their relation to obligations, and the dynamics of obligations over time. There-
fore, insights from deontic logic can be used to represent and reason with norms. Deontic
logic also offers representations of norms as rules or conditionals. However, there are sev-
eral aspects of norms which are not covered by constraints nor by deontic logic, such as
the relation between the cognitive abilities of agents and the global properties of norms.
Conte et al.14 say that normative multiagent systems research focuses on two different
sets of problems. On the one hand, they claim that legal theory and deontic logic supply
a theory for of norm-governed interaction of autonomous agents while at the same time
lacking a model that integrates the different social and normative concepts of this theory.
On the other hand, they claim that three other problems are of interest in multiagent systems
research on norms: how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms, and how
an agent can be autonomous. For artificial agents, norms can be designed as in legal human
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systems, forced upon, for example when joining an institution, or they can emerge from
the agents making them norm autonomous.39 Agent decision making in normative systems
and the relation between desires and obligations has been studied in agent architectures,10
which thus explain how norms and obligations influence agent behavior.
An important question is where norms come from. Norms are not necessarily created by
a single legislator, they can also emerge spontaneously, or be negotiated among the agents.
In electronic commerce research, for example, cognitive foundations of social norms and
contracts are studied.7 Protocols and social mechanisms are now being developed to sup-
port such creations of norms in multiagent systems. When norms are created, the question
can be raised how they are enforced. For example, when a contract is violated, the violator
may have to pay a penalty. But then there has to be a monitoring and sanctioning system,
for example police agents in an electronic institution. Such protocols or roles in a multia-
gent system are part of the construction of social reality, and Searle32 has argued that such
social realities are constructed by constitutive norms. This again raises the question how
to represent such constitutive or counts-as norms, and how they are related to regulative
norms like obligations and permissions.8
Not only the relation between norms and agents must be studied, but also the relation
between norms and other social and legal concepts. How do norms structure organizations?
How do norms coordinate groups and societies? How about the contract frames in which
contracts live? How about the relation between legal courts? Though in some normative
multiagent systems there is only a single normative system, there can also be several of
them, raising the question how normative systems interact. For example, in a virtual com-
munity of resource providers each provider may have its own normative system, which
raises the question how one system can authorize access in another system, or how global
policies can be defined to regulate these local policies.8
Summarizing, normative multiagent systems study general and domain independent
properties of norms. It builds on results obtained in deontic logic, the logic of obligations
and permissions, for the representation of norms as rules, the application of such rules,
contrary-to-duty reasoning and the relation to permissions. However, it goes beyond logical
relations among obligations and permissions by explaining the relation among social norms
and obligations, relating regulative norms to constitutive norms, explaining the evolution
of normative systems, and much more.
Within multiagent systems, norms and social laws are used to design social mech-
anisms, and in normative systems, agent theory is used to analyze and simulate social
phenomena. Various examples can be found in a forthcoming double special issue of Com-
putational and Mathematical Organizational Theory on normative multiagent systems.9
The models most closely related to the one presented in this paper can be found in work
on artificial social systems by Tennenholtz and colleagues, and the work on social theory
by Castelfranchi, Conte and colleagues, which we discuss in the following section. The
detailed model of normative systems including a sanction-based control system together
with the game-theoretic aspects like acceptance and backward induction distinguishes
our approach from numerous other approaches of social norms and laws in multiagent
systems.16,17,18,19,24,33
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3. Social delegation cycle
To motivate our model, we start with an abstract description of the social delegation cycle
using artificial social systems. The problem studied in artificial social systems is the de-
sign, emergence or more generally the creation of social laws. Shoham and Tennenholtz33
introduce social laws in a setting without utilities, and they define rational social laws as
social laws that improve a social game variable.34 We follow Tennenholtz’ presentation of
artificial social systems for stable social laws.36
The desires of the agents are represented by their utilities. A game or multi-agent en-
counter is a set of agents with for each agent a set of strategies and a utility function defined
on each possible combination of strategies. Tennenholtz only defines games for two agents
to keep the presentation of artificial social systems as simple as possible, but he observes
also that the extension to the multi-agent case is straightforward.36
Definition 3.1. A game (or a multi-agent encounter) is a tuple 〈N,S, T, U1, U2〉, where
N = {1, 2} is a set of agents, S and T are the sets of strategies available to agents 1 and 2
respectively, and U1 : S × T → IR and U2 : S × T → IR are real-valued utility functions
for agents 1 and 2, respectively.
The social goal is represented by a minimal value for the social game variable.
Tennenholtz36 uses as game variable the maximin value. This represents safety level de-
cisions, in the sense that the agent optimizes its worst outcome assuming the other agents
may follow any of their possible behaviors. See Tennenholtz’ paper for a discussion why
this is natural in many multi-agent systems, where a payoff corresponds to the achievement
of a particular user’s specification.
Definition 3.2. Let S and T be the sets of strategies available agent 1 and 2, respectively,
and let Ui be the utility function of agent i. Define U1(s, T ) = mint∈T U1(s, t) for s ∈ S,
and U2(S, t) = mins∈S U2(s, t) for t ∈ T . The maximin value for agent 1 (respectively 2)
is defined by maxs∈S U1(s, T ) (respectively maxt∈T U2(S, t)). A strategy of agent i lead-
ing to the corresponding maximin value is called a maximin strategy for agent i.
The social norm is represented by a social law, which has been characterized as a re-
striction of the strategies available to the agents. It is useful with respect to an efficiency
parameter e if each agent can choose a strategy that guarantees it a payoff of at least e.
Definition 3.3. Given a game g = 〈N,S, T, U1, U2〉 and an efficiency parameter e, we
define a social law to be a restriction of S to S ⊆ S, and of T ⊆ T . The social law
is useful if the following holds: there exists s ∈ S such that U1(s, T ) ≥ e, and there
exists t ∈ T such that U2(S, t) ≥ e. A (useful) convention is a (useful) social law where
|S| = |T | = 1.
A social law is quasi-stable if an agent does not profit from violating the law, as long
as the other agent conforms to the social law (i.e., selects strategies allowed by the law).
Definition 3.4. Given a game g = 〈N,S, T, U1, U2〉, and an efficiency parameter e,
a quasi-stable social law is a useful social law (with respect to e) which restricts S
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to S and T to T , and satisfies the following: there is no s′ ∈ S − S which satisfies
U1(s′, T ) > maxs∈S U1(s, T ), and there is no t′ ∈ T − T which satisfies
U2(S, t′) > maxt∈T U2(S, t).
The three steps of the social delegation cycle in this classical game-theoretic setting can
be identified as follows.
Goal negotiation implies that the efficiency parameter is higher than the utility the agents
expect without the norm, for example represented by the Nash equilibria of the
game.
Norm negotiation implies that the social law is useful (with respect to the efficiency pa-
rameter).
Acceptance relation implies that the social law is quasi-stable.
An important class of examples from game theory are coordination problems, like the
choice between driving on either the right hand or the left hand side of the road. Such
problems are characterized by the fact that it does not matter which option we choose, as
long as everyone chooses the same option. Another classic example from game theory is
the prisoner’s dilemma, which is characterized by the fact that optimal situations can be
reached only when we introduce sanctions on behaviors (such as defecting). Both of these
examples can be modeled in artificial social systems. Without norms the agents expect
accidents and defects, and therefore in goal negotiation the efficiency parameter is set such
that there are no accidents, and no defections. The norm negotiation implies that the agent
should all drive on the right hand side of the street and they should not defect (otherwise
they are sanctioned), and finally the agents accept the norm, because they know that another
agent will obey it (if all other agents do so too).
However, there are also drawbacks of this game-theoretic model of the social delegation
cycle. Due to the uniform description of agents in the game-theoretic model, it is less clear
how to distinguish among kinds of agents. For example, the unique utility aspiration level
does not distinguish the powers of agents to negotiate a better deal for themselves than for
the other agents. Moreover, the formalization of the social delegation cycle does neither
give a clue how the efficiency parameter is negotiated, nor how the social law is negotiated.
For example, the desires of the agents as well as other mental attitudes may play a role in
this negotiation. Finally, an additional drawback is that the three ingredients of the model
(agent desires, social goals, and social laws) are formalized in three different ways. These
drawbacks also seem to hold when a normative system to encode enforceable social laws
is added to the artificial social system model.6
To make a more realistic representation of the above notions, some models use a more
detailed cognitive agent theory, in which agents are motivated by desires and goals, and
norms are explicitly represented inside agents. For example, Conte et al.14 discuss under
which conditions new norms can be acquired by cognitive agents by recognizing them
and accepting that they become goals. Conte et al.’s first condition for norm recognition
concerns the evaluation of the source. They say that “if the norm is not based upon a
recognized norm, the entity y that has issued the norm is evaluated. If y is perceived to
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be entitled to issue norms (it is a normative authority), then [the obligation issued by y
and addressed to the set of agents X to obtain q, written as] OyX(q), can be accepted as
a norm.” Their second relevant issue in the recognition of a norm is the evaluation of the
motives for which the norm has been issued. “OyX(q) is issued for y’s personal/private
interest, rather than for the interest y is held to protect: if x believes that y’s prescription is
only due to some private desire, etc., x will not take it as a norm. x might ignore what the
norm is for, what its utility is for the group or its institutions, but may expect that the norm
is aimed at having a positive influence for the group; at least, it is necessary that x does not
have the opposite belief, that is, that the norm is not aimed to be ‘good for’ the group at
large, but only for y. ... y is entitled only to deliver prescriptions and permissions that are
aimed at the general rather than at its own private interest.”
Conte et al. claim that for the acceptance of norms as goals to be considered in the
decision process requires, instead, the following stronger condition.
“A norm-autonomous agent accepts a norm q, only if it sees accepting q
as a way of achieving (one of) its own further goal(s).”
This condition is formalized as follows, where OBTX(q) means that the agents X
obtain q. It “states that x forms a normative goal OBTX(q) (i.e. accepts the norm q)
if x believes that the norm exists (for agents in set X) and that fulfilling the norm (i.e.
OBTX(q)) is instrumental to one of its own goals.”
BELx(OyX(q) ∧ INSTR(OBTX(q), p) ∧GOALx(p|r)) ⊃
N -GOALx(OBTX(q)|GOALx(p|r) ∧ r)
Conte et al. emphasize that they “do not require q to be instrumental for the goal p, but
rather OBTX(q). With OBTX(q) in this context we mean the fulfilment of the norm q by
all members of X . The difference is that in this case we only try to fulfil the norm, because
it is a norm. We could also have the much stronger case in which we believe that the norm
itself is to the benefit of our goal p. This is somehow ‘internalising’ the norm and making
it our own goal. This would formally be described by:
BELx(OyX(q) ∧ INSTR(q, p) ∧GOALx(p|r)) ⊃ C -GOALx(q|GOALx(p|r) ∧ r) ”
Conte et al. observe that the achievement of the norm can be instrumental to some goal
of the agent in different ways:
(1) Arbitrated instrumentality: “x sees accepting q as a means to obtain a non-natural con-
sequent reward. In particular, avoidance of punishment, social praise, etc.,” where they
distinguish among avoidance of external or internal punishment, and achievement of
external or internal reward.
(2) Natural instrumentality, where they distinguish self-interested from value-oriented.
Finally, Conte et al. observe that a norm must have general recognition. “Without a
general recognition, a social norm is not a norm. (At the legal level it is sufficient that the
authority is recognised as authority and that the norm is recognised as correctly issued by
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it). Autonomous agents subject to norms are in fact autonomous norm creators. They create
norms through their evaluation and recognition, through their compliance, and through their
interpersonal issuing, monitoring and judging.”
From this cognitive setting we learn the following for the social delegation cycle:
Goal negotiation: To be a norm, a norm must not be issued in the interest of the authority
only. Thus for an agent to recognize a norm as such, the norm must be aimed to be
good for the group at large.
Norm negotiation: The creation of a norm must lead to a norm which achieves some agent
own’s goals: for example, the goal not to be considered as a violator and sanctioned, or
to be rewarded.
Acceptance relation: To be a norm the norm must be recognized, accepted and complied
with in general. Thus, the norm is created also by means of the agents’ behavior.
Given the cognitive perspective, Conte et al.’s model allows a deeper understanding
of the acquisition of norms. It leaves, however, several issues informal. In particular, what
does it mean that a norm is “good for” the group at large”? What does it means that it
is recognized in general? In general, how can a game-theoretic analysis be added to a
cognitive one to understand how norms are created?
In this paper we answer these questions in a cognitive agent framework. In our model
agent desires, social goals and social laws are all represented by qualitative rules, formal-
ized using input/output logics.25 To formalize and characterize the negotiation of social
goals and of obligations together with their sanctions we have to formalize the negotiation
protocol including the allowed proposals: proposals which do not meet general interests
cannot be made. Our model builds on several existing formal theories to define the accept-
able proposals:
Goal negotiation is based on proposals where the social goal is obtained using merging
operators, which have been proposed as generalizations of belief revision operators
inspired by social choice theory.
Norm negotiation is based on proposals that create for each social goal a set of obligations
(or revisions of existing obligations) together with sanctions or rewards.
Acceptance relation accepts or rejects a norm based on the stability criterion of artifi-
cial social systems and the general acceptance of cognitive theories, together with a
cost-benefit analysis of the agents that the costs of having to comply to the norm are
outweighed by the benefit of the social goal of the norm.
As a running example, we consider three sets of agents, who can work together in
various ways. They can make a coalition to each perform a task, or they can distribute five
tasks among them and obtain an even more desirable social goal. There can be free riders,
so they need sanctions to ensure that the norm is accepted.
We define in the following sections the conceptual framework based on rule based
systems, the generic negotiation protocol used both for social goal negotiation and norm
negotiation, and the logic of rules based on input/output logics.
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4. Conceptual model of normative multiagent systems
The conceptual model used in this paper is visualized in Figure 2, in which we distinguish
the multiagent system (straight lines) and additions for the normative system (dotted lines).
Following the usual conventions of for example class diagrams in the unified modelling
language (UML), 2 is a concept or set, — and → are relations or associations among
concepts, and −−. is the “is-a” or subset relation. The logical structure of the associations
is detailed in the definitions below.
A
X G
AD AD
Rul
MD
Lit
D
>
P
V
GD
N
MDE
Fig. 2. Conceptual model of normative multiagent system.
The model consists of a set of agents (A) described (AD) by a set of boolean vari-
ables (X), including decision variables it can perform, and desires (D) guiding its decision
making. Desire rules can be conflicting, and the way the agent resolves its conflicts is de-
scribed by a priority relation (≥) that expresses its agent characteristics10. The priority re-
lation is defined on the powerset of the motivations such that a wide range of characteristics
can be described, including social agents that take the desires of other agents or social goals
into account. The priority relation contains at least the subset-relation which expresses a
kind of independence between the motivations. Variables which are not decision variables
are called parameters (P ).
Definition 4.1. (AS) An agent set is a tuple 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉, where:
• the agents A, variables X and agent desires D are three finite disjoint sets.
• an agent description AD : A→ 2X∪D is a complete function that maps each agent to
sets of variables (its decision variables) and desires, but that does not necessarily assign
each variable to at least one agent. For each agent a ∈ A, we write Xa for X ∩AD(a),
and Da for D ∩AD(a). We write parameters P = X \ ∪a∈AXa.
• a priority relation ≥: A → 2D × 2D is a function from agents to a transitive and
reflexive relation on the powerset of the desires containing at least the subset relation.
We write ≥a for ≥ (a).
The motivational state of the society is composed of its social goals (G), and back-
ground knowledge is formalized by a set of effect rules (E). Desires and social goals are
abstract concepts which are described by – though conceptually not identified with – rules
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(Rul ) built from literals (Lit). They are therefore not represented by propositional formu-
las, as in some other approaches to agency.13,29 Agents may share decision variables, or
desires, though this expressive power is not used in this paper.
Definition 4.2. (MAS) A multiagent system is a tuple 〈AS , G,E,MD〉, where AS =
〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉 is an agent set, and:
• the set of goals G is a set disjoint from A, X , and D. The motivations M = D∪G are
defined as the union of the desires and social goals.
• the set of literals built from X , written as Lit(X), is X ∪ {¬x | x ∈ X}, and the set
of rules built from X , written as Rul(X) = 2Lit(X) × Lit(X), is the set of pairs of a
set of literals built from X and a literal built from X , written as {l1, . . . , ln} → l. We
also write l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l and when n = 0 we write > → l. Moreover, for x ∈ X
we write ∼x for ¬x and ∼(¬x) for x.
• the set of effects E ⊆ Rul(X) is a set of rules built from X .
• the motivational description MD :M → Rul(X) is a complete function from the sets
of desires and goals to the set of rules built from X . For a set of motivations S ⊆ M ,
we write MD(S) = {MD(s) | s ∈ S}.
To describe the normative system, we introduce a set of norms (N ) and a norm descrip-
tion that associates violations with variables (V).
Definition 4.3. (NMAS ) A normative multiagent system is a tuple 〈MAS , N, V 〉, where
MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 is a multiagent system, AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉 is an agent set,
and moreover:
• the set of norms N is a set disjoint from A, X , D, and G.
• the norm description V : N × A → P is a complete function that maps each pair of
a norm and an agent to the parameters, where V (n, a) ∈ P represents that a violation
by agent a of the norm n has been recognized.
We define sanction- and reward-based obligations in the normative multiagent system
using an extension of Anderson’s well-known reduction2,28: violations and sanctions are
the consequences of not fulfilling a norm. It covers a kind of ought-to-do and a kind of
ought-to-be obligations.
Definition 4.4. (Obligation) Let NMAS = 〈MAS , N, V 〉, MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉
and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉. We say that:
• x is obligatory for agent a in NMAS iff ∃n ∈ N with ∼x→ V (n, a) ∈ E,
• s is a sanction for agent a in NMAS iff ∃n ∈ N with V (n, a)→ s ∈ E, and
• r is a reward for agent a in NMAS iff ∃n ∈ N with ¬V (n, a)→ r ∈ E.
More sophisticated notions within this kind of framework are developed elsewhere.7 In
this paper we now turn to the negotiation protocol.
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5. Generic negotiation protocol and logic of rules
A negotiation protocol is described by a sequence of negotiation actions which either lead
to success or failure. In this paper we only consider protocols in which the agents propose
a so-called deal, and when an agent has made such a proposal, then the other agents can
either accept or reject it. Moreover, they can also end the negotiation process without any
result. Such negotiation protocols can be represented by a finite state machine, but we do
not consider such representations in this paper. For turn-taking, we assume that the agents
involved are ordered (º).
Definition 5.1. (Protocol) A negotiation protocol is a tuple
NP = 〈Ag , deals, actions, valid ,finished , broken,º〉 where:
• the agents Ag , deals and actions are three disjoint sets, such that
actions = {propose(a, d), accept(a, d), reject(a, d) | a ∈ Ag , d ∈ deals}
∪ {breakit(a) | a ∈ Ag}.
• valid , finished , broken are three sets of finite sequences of actions .
• º ⊆ Ag ×Ag is a total order on Ag,
We instantiate this generic protocol for negotiations in normative multiagent systems.
We assume that a sequence of actions (a history) is valid when each agent does an action
respecting its turn in the ordering of agents. Then, after each proposal, the other agents
have to accept or reject this proposal, again respecting the ordering of agents, until they all
accept it or one of them rejects it. When it is an agent’s turn to make a proposal, it can also
end the negotiation by breaking it. The history is finished when all agents have accepted
the last deal, and broken when the last agent has ended the negotiations.
Definition 5.2. (NMAS protocol) Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system
〈MAS , N, V 〉 together with MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉.
A negotiation protocol NP = 〈Ag, deals, actions, valid, finished, broken〉,º〉 for
NMAS satisfies the following constraints:
• the set of agents Ag ⊆ A consists of the negotiators representing the agents A;
• A sequence h ends iff either all agents have accepted the last proposal (finished(h)) or
the last agent has broken the negotiation (broken(h)) instead of making a new proposal.
• a history h is a sequence of actions, and valid(h) holds if:
– the propose and breakit actions in the sequence respect º,
– each propose is followed by a sequence of accept or reject actions respecting º
until either all agents have accepted the deal or one has rejected it,
– there is no double occurrence of a proposal propose(a, d) of a deal d ∈ deals by
any agent a ∈ Ag , and
– the sequence h ends.
The open issue of the generic negotiation protocol is the set of deals which can be
proposed. They depend on the kind of negotiation. In social goal negotiation the deals
represent a social goal, and in norm negotiation the deals contain the obligations of the
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agents and the associated control system based on sanctions. To define the deals, we have
to be more precise about the logic of rules we use.
We use a simplified input/output logic.25,26 A rule base is a set of rules, i.e., a set of
ordered pairs p→ q. For each such pair, the body p is thought of as an input, representing
some condition or situation, and the head q is thought of as an output, representing what the
norm tells us to be desirable, obligatory or whatever in that situation. We use input/output
logics since they do not necessarily satisfy the identity rule. Makinson and van der Torre
write (p, q) to distinguish input/output rules from conditionals defined in other logics, to
emphasize the property that input/output logic does not necessarily obey the identity rule.
In this paper we do not follow this convention.
In this paper, input and output are respectively a set of literals and a literal. We use a
simplified version of input/output logics, since it keeps the formal exposition simple and it
is sufficient for our purposes here. In Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output logics, the
input and output can be arbitrary propositional formulas, not just sets of literals and literal
as we do here. Consequently, in input/output logic there are additional rules for conjunction
of outputs and for weakening outputs.
Definition 5.3. (Input/output logic25) Let a rule base B be a set of rules
{p1 → q1, . . . , pn → qn}, read as ‘if input p1 then output q1’, etc., and consider the
following proof rules strengthening of the input (SI), disjunction of the input (OR), and
cumulative transitivity (CT) defined as follows:
p→ r
p ∧ q → rSI
p ∧ q → r, p ∧ ¬q → r
p→ r OR
p→ q, p ∧ q → r
p→ r CT
The following four output operators are defined as closure operators on the set B using the
rules above.
out1: SI (simple-minded output) out3: SI+CT (reusable output)
out2: SI+OR (basic output) out4: SI+OR+CT (basic reusable output)
We write out(B) for any of these output operations, we write B `iol p → q for
p→ q ∈ out(B), and we write B `iol B′ iff B `iol p→ q for all p→ q ∈ B′.
The following definition of the so-called input-output constraint checks whether the
derived conditional goals are consistent with the input.
Definition 5.4. (Constraints26) Let B be a set of rules, and C a set of literals. B is
consistent with C, written as cons(B|C), iff there do not exist two contradictory literals p
and ¬p in the set C ∪ {l|B `iol C → l}. We write cons(B) for cons(B|∅).
The semantics of input/output logics, further details on its proof theory, the exten-
sion with the identity rule, alternative constraints, permissions, and examples are described
elsewhere.25,26,27 We do not consider the negotiation of permissions or constitutive norms
in this paper.
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6. Social goal negotiation
We characterize the allowed deals during goal negotiation as a merger or fusion of the
desires of the agents, which may be seen as a particular kind of social choice process.23
Technically, we use the merging operators for merging desires into goals in the context
of beliefs,15,23, which are generalizations of belief revision operators.1,20,22. We simplify
these operators, because we do not use beliefs, and we make them more complex, because
we extend the operators defined on propositional formulas to merge rules.
Definition 6.1. A rule base B is a set of desire rules of an agent, a rule set S of a multia-
gent system is a multi-set of rule bases. Two rule sets S1 and S2 are equivalent, written as
S1 ↔ S2, iff there exists a bijection f from S1 = {B11 , . . . , Bn1 } to S2 = {B12 , . . . , Bn2 }
such that out(f(Bi1)) = out(Bi1) for i = 1 . . . n. We write
∧
S for the union of all rules
in S, and unionsq for union with multi-sets.
A merging operator is defined by a set of postulates the result of the merger has to
obey. For example, the social goal should not violate the integrity constraints (R0 in Defini-
tion 6.2.), when the integrity constraints are consistent we should always manage to extract
a coherent social goal from the rule set (R1), and if possible, the social goal is simply the
conjunction of the rule bases of the rule set with the integrity constraints (R2). Moreover,
the principle of irrelevance of syntax says that if we change the syntax but not the meaning
of the desire rules of the agents, the social goal does not change (R3).
Koniecnzy23 introduces the fairness postulate, which ensures that when merging two
rule bases, the operator cannot give full preference to one of them (R4). Pareto’s conditions
in Arrow’s social choice theory3 detail how mergers of sets of rules are related (R5 and R6).
Finally there are conditions on the conjunction of integrity constraints (R7 and R8). See the
above mentioned papers for further details and motivations. In the following definition, as
well as in all following definitions, we assume that a logic of rules has been fixed.
Definition 6.2. Let `iol be an output operation, S be a rule set, E a rule base, and ∇ an
operator that assigns to each rule set S and rule base E a rule base ∇E(S). ∇ is a rule
merging operator if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
R0 If not cons(E), then ∇E(S)↔ E
R1 If cons(E), then cons(∇E(S))
R2a
∧
S `iol ∇E(S)
R2b If cons(
∧
S ∪ E), then ∇E(S) `iol
∧
S
R3 If S1 ↔ S2 and E1 ↔ E2, then ∇E1(S1)↔ ∇E2(S2)
R4 If B `iol E, B′ `iol E, and cons(∇E({B} unionsq {B′}) ∪B ∪ E),
then cons(∇E({B} unionsq {B′}) ∪B′ ∪ E)
R5 ∇E(S1) ∪∇E(S2) `iol ∇E(S1 unionsq S2)
R6 If cons(∇E(S1) ∪∇E(S2) ∪ E), then ∇E(S1 unionsq S2) `iol ∇E(S1) ∪∇E(S2)
R7 If cons(E1 ∪ E2), then ∇E1(S) `iol ∇E1∪E2(S)
R8 If cons(∇E1(S) ∪ E1 ∪ E2), then ∇E1∪E2(S) `iol ∇E1(S)
Additional properties and the semantics of merging operators have been defined in the
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literature.23 In this paper, we only consider social goals consisting of one rule. At first sight
this may seem like a strong restriction, but more complex examples can be modeled using
effect rules in E.
Definition 6.3. (Deals in goal negotiation) In the goal negotiation protocol, the type of
the allowed deals is that deals are a rule base consisting of a single rule.
Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system 〈MAS , N, V 〉 together with
MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉. We have d ∈ deals iff there
is a rule merging operator ∇ such that MD(d) ⊆ ∇E(MD(D(x)) | x ∈ A).
The following example illustrates that the allowed deals depend on the chosen in-
put/output logic.
Example 6.1. Let `iol be out3, and consider four agents with desires represented by rule
bases each consisting of a single rule S = {{> → p}, {> → q}, {p → r}, {q → ¬r}}.
We cannot take all rules in S as the social goal, since they are not consistent. Formally, due
to (R1) we cannot propose the deal ∇∅(S) =
∧
S, because we do not have cons(
∧
S).
We can take for example either the deal ∇∅(S) = {> → p,> → q, p → r}, or the
deal ∇∅(S) = {> → q, p → r, q → ¬r}, since they are consistent and they satisfy the
other postulates. For example, they satisfy (R4) since there are no two rule bases directly
conflicting with each other. In general, checking whether a social goal base satisfies the
merging postulates is non-trivial, and can be based on the semantics of merging operators.23
If we assume that `iol is out1, then cons(
∧
S), and due to (R2b) we have ∇∅(S) =
∧
S.
Social goal negotiation is illustrated by our running example. We consider three sets of
agents, who can work together in various ways. They can make a coalition to each perform
a task, or they can distribute five tasks among them and obtain an even more desirable
social goal. Variables in the example are syntactic sugar. Quantification over rules means
that rules are schemata: there is a set of rules, one for each agent involved. Note that the set
of agents A is finite.
Example 6.2. (Running example) Let NMAS = 〈MAS , N, V 〉 together with
MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3, X,D,AD ,≥〉 be a normative
multiagent system with, amongst others, the following ingredients:
variables: X = {task1(a), task2(a), task3(a) | a ∈ A1} ∪ . . .
Each agent in A1 can perform task 1,2,3, each agent in A2 can perform task 2,3,4, and
each agent in A3 can perform task 3, 4, and 5.
effect rules: E = {. . . ∪ ∧i=1...5taski → best state}
Performing task 1, 3 and 5 will lead to some good result, and all five tasks will lead to
the best result.
desires: for a ∈ A1, MD(Da) = {task4, task5},. . . .
Each agent desires the tasks it cannot perform itself.
Social goal MD(G) = {> → best state}.
The agents negotiate the social goal to perform all five tasks for NMAS .
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7. Norm negotiation
We formalize the allowed deals during norm negotiation as solutions of a planning prob-
lem, distinguishing between the obligations and the associated sanctions and rewards. The
planning problem for the obligations is that the obligations of the agents must imply the
social goal. We represent a norm n by an obligation for all agents in the multiagent system,
that is, for every agent a we introduce an obligation ∼x→ V (n, a). Moreover, since goals
can only be in force in a context, e.g., Y → g, we introduce in context Y an obligation
Y ∧ ∼x → V (n, a). Roughly, the condition is that the conjunction of all obligations x
imply the social goal g.
However, to determine whether the obligations imply the social goal, we have to take
the existing normative system into account. We assume that the normative system only cre-
ates obligations that can be fulfilled together with the already existing obligations. More-
over, for the test that the social goal g will be achieved, we propose the following condition:
if every agent fulfills its obligation, and it fulfills all its other obligations, then g is achieved.
We define a global violation constantV as the disjunction of all indexed violation constants
like V (n, a), i.e., V =
∨
n∈N,a∈A V (n, a).
Note that the type of the proposed deals in norm negotiation is more complex than the
type in goal negotiation. In goal negotiation each agent can propose a social goal, which is
a rule base. In norm negotiation each agent can propose a norm, which contains obligation
rules together with sanction rules (for each agent).
Definition 7.1. (Deals in norm negotiation with sanctions and rewards) In norm ne-
gotiation, the type of deals is a pair of rule bases.
Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system 〈MAS , N, V 〉 together with
MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉, and let Y → g ∈ MD(G) be a
social goal. We assume that the parameters contain the global violation constant V ∈ P
and E contains the following set of rules:
{V (n, a)→ V | n ∈ N, a ∈ A} ∪ {¬V→ ¬V (n, a) | n ∈ N, a ∈ A}
We have 〈E′, E′′〉 ∈ deals when E′ is a set of obligations and E′′ is a set of sanctions and
rewards, defined as follows,
E′ ⊆ {Y ∧ x→ V (n′, a) | a ∈ A, x ∈ Lit(X)}
E′′ ⊆ {Y ∧V (n′, a)→ s | a ∈ A, s ∈ Lit(X)}∪{Y ∧¬V (n′, a)→ r | a ∈ A, r ∈ Lit(X)}
and, moreover:
(1) The norm n′ is not already part of N ;
(2) E′ is a set of obligations for each a ∈ A such that E ∪ E′ `iol ¬V ∧ Y → g, if all
norms are fulfilled, then the social goal is fulfilled;
(3) cons(E | Y ∧ ¬V), it is possible that no norm is violated.
(4) E′′ is a set of sanctions and rewards for each a ∈ A such that for all such s and r we
have Da `iol Y → ¬s or D `iol Y → r, sanctions are undesired and rewards are
desired.
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If the norm n′ with obligations E′ and sanctions and rewards E′′ to achieve social goal
Y → g in deals is accepted, then it leads to the updated system 〈MAS , N ∪ {n′}, V 〉 with
MAS = 〈AS , E ∪ E′ ∪ E′′,MD〉.
The following example illustrates norm negotiation in our running example. There can
be free riders, so they need sanctions to ensure that the norm is accepted.
Example 7.1. (Continued) The normative multiagent system is further detailed as fol-
lows (we assume that the same social goal is negotiated):
Desires: MD(D) = . . . ∪ {> → ¬task1(a),> → ¬task2(a), . . . | a ∈ A1} ∪ . . .
Each agent desires not to perform any tasks. These desires are weaker (have lower
priority in º) than the desire that the other tasks are performed. Moreover, each agent
desires not to be sanctioned, written as s(a).
Effect rules
We now assume that not all agents have to contribute to a task, but only most of them.
Thus there can be free riders.
E.g., a possible deal contains the obligations E′ = {¬task1(a)→ V (n′, a) | a ∈ A1} and
sanctions E′′ = {V (n′, a) → s(a) | a ∈ A}. ¬task1(a) counts as a violation of norm n′
by agent a, and is sanctioned with s(a).
The following example illustrates the negotiation protocol.
Example 7.2. (Continued) Consider three agents that have to negotiate a task consisting
of five subtasks,with social goal g = > → best state , the NMAS protocol is:
Ag = {a1, a2, a3} with a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2, a3 ∈ A3,
deals = the sets of pairs 〈τδ, τσ〉 where the set of obligations τδ belongs to the set
∆ = {δ = {task1(a1), task2(a2), task3(a3), task4(a4), task5(a5)} | a1, . . . , a5 ∈ Ag}.
Moreover, τσ is a tuple of |A| elements specifying a sanction si ∈ X for every agent in A.
Here is a history h, where a1 proposes something which is not accepted, but a2 thereafter
proposes a distribution which is accepted:
action1 : propose(a1, d1 = 〈τδ, 〈s1, s2, s3〉〉) where
τδ = {task1(a1), task2(a2), task3(a3), task4(a3), task5(a3)}
action2 : accept(a2, d1)
action3 : reject(a3, d1)
action4 : propose(a2, d2 = 〈τ ′δ, 〈s1, s2, s3〉〉) where
τ ′δ = {task1(a1), task2(a2), task3(a2), task4(a3), task5(a3)}
action5 : accept(a3, d2)
action6 : accept(a1, d2)
We have valid(h), because the order of action respects ≤, and we have accepted(h),
because the history ends with acceptance by all agents (action5 and action6) after a pro-
posal (action4).
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8. Norm acceptance and agent decision making
An agent accepts a norm when the obligation implies some desire the cycle started with,
and moreover, it believes that the other agents will fulfill their obligations. We propose
the following games: agent a plays a game with arbitrary agent b and accepts the norm if
agent b fulfills the norm given that all other agents fulfill the norm, and this fulfilment leads
to fulfillment of agent a’s desire the cycle started with. This implies that the fulfillment
of the goal g is kind of normative equilibrium. The details and examples of the decision
model and the notion of unfulfilled desires for conditional rules can be found in our work
on normative multiagent systems.7,8
Definition 8.1. (Decision) Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system 〈MAS , N, V 〉
with MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉. The optimal decision of
agent b ∈ A given a set of literals C is defined as follows.
• The set of decisions ∆ is the set of subsets of Lit(Xb) that do not contain a variable
and its negation. A decision is complete if it contains, for each variable in Xb, either
this variable or its negation.
• The unfulfilled desires of decision δ for agent b ∈ A, written as U(δ, b), are the desires
whose body is part of the decision, but whose head is not.
{d ∈ Db | MD(d) = L→ l, E `iol C ∪ δ → l′ for l′ ∈ L and E 6`iol C ∪ δ → l}
• A decision δ is optimal for agent b if and only if there is no decision δ′ such that
U(δ, b) >b U(δ′, b).
We use the definition of optimal decision to define the acceptance relation. We define
a variant of the global violation constant V∼b as the disjunction of the violation constants
of all agents except agent b. We assume here that the agents only consider typical cases. In
reality there are always exceptions to the norm, but we do not take this into account.
Definition 8.2. (Acceptance) Let NMAS be a normative multia-
gent system 〈MAS , N, V 〉 with MAS = 〈AS , G,E,MD〉 and AS = 〈A,X,D,AD ,≥〉,
and let NMAS ′ = 〈MAS ′, N ∪ {n′}, V 〉 with MAS ′ = 〈AS , E ∪ E′ ∪ E′′,MD〉 be the
system after the creation of a norm. The parameters contain the global violation constants
V∼b ∈ P and E contains the following rules:
{V (n, x)→ V∼b | n ∈ N, x ∈ A \ {b}} ∪ {¬V∼b → ¬V (n, x) | n ∈ N, x ∈ A \ {b}}
An agent a ∈ A accepts the norm if:
(1) There is a desire in D which is not fulfilled in NMAS , but it is fulfilled in NMAS ′.
(2) For all other agents b ∈ A, we have that the optimal decision of agent b assuming
¬V∼b implies ¬V.
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Norms do not always need to be accepted in order to be fulfilled, since the sanction
provides a motivation to the agents. However, for a norm to be really effective must be
respected due to its acceptance, and not only due to fear of sanctions.
Decision making is not restricted to the normative multiagent system, but it can be
extended to the negotiation protocol. We do not consider an equilibrium analysis as in the
acceptance relation, but we use the game-theoretic notion called backward induction. In
the literature on multi-agent systems it is sometimes referred to as recursive modelling.
The games we define are as follows. First the agents negotiate the joint goal and the
norm, then they make a decision in the normative multiagent system to either fulfill the
obligations or accept the associated sanctions.
Definition 8.3. A history h1 dominates a history h2 at step i if they have the same
set of actions at step 1 . . . i − 1, are optimal for step i + 1 . . ., and outcomes(h1) Âa
outcomes(h2), agent a performing action i prefers the set of possible outcomes of h1 to
the set of possible outcomes of h2.
A history is optimal at step i if it is not dominated by another history, and it is optimal
at all steps j > i.
A history is optimal if it is optimal at step 1.
The behavior of agents in the negotiation protocol is illustrated in the following exam-
ple.
Example 8.1. (Continued) Reconsider Example 6.3 with history h, together with his-
tory h′ which is like h until action3 while it continues in this way:
action4 : propose(a3, d3 = 〈τ ′′δ , 〈s1, s2, s3〉〉) where
τ ′′δ = {task1(a1), task2(a2), task3(a2), task4(a2), task5(a3)}
action5 : accept(a1, d3)
action6 : reject(a3, d3)
action7 : breakit(a1)
Assume that according to agent a3 both h and h′ are optimal from action5 onwards,
then agent a5 compares the two histories to decide how to choose between the two histories.
Likewise, the agents of the first three actions decide their optimal actions based on the
optimal choice of agent a3 for action4.
There are a couple of issues with backward induction. First, the length of the histories
has to be bounded, because otherwise there is no starting point for the backward induction.
Second, if the agents’ desires are not common knowledge, then we have to add the desires
of agent ai according to aj , the desires of agent ai according to agent aj according to ak,
etc. An efficient representation of such nested modalities is still an open problem. For this
reason, in game theory it is usually assumed that the game is common knowledge.
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9. Negotiation and related work in normative multiagent systems
In this section we compare norm negotiation in the social delegation cycle with other work
on normative multiagent systems.
9.1. The origin of norms
Social norms and laws can be used to guide the emergent behavior of multiagent systems.12
But where do these social norms and laws come from? The following four possibilities have
been discussed or suggested in the literature on multiagent systems.
(1) Norms are off-line designed by the agent programmer.33 However, off-line design has
been criticized for open systems.
(2) Norms are created by a single agent in a “legislator” role.11 The legislator faces the
decision problem to decide which norm, sanction and control system has to be created.
However, the agent playing the legislator role is vulnerable for attacks or fraud.
(3) Norms emerge spontaneously like conventions.4,34 However, conventions can be crit-
icized as a coordination mechanism for dynamic systems, because they develop only
after a long time (if at all) and they are difficult to change.
(4) Norms are negotiated by (a subset of) the agents in a “democracy”, which raises the
problem to devise fair and efficient norm negotiation protocols.
Other approaches of norm emergence are based on simulation techniques. Verhagen,39
for example, considers the problem of the learning of norms. He does not focus however
on the acceptance of norms but rather on the influence of normative comments on previous
choices. Thus this approach is outside the scope of this paper.
9.2. Negotiation of obligation distribution
The social delegation cycle distinguishes norm negotiation from other kinds of negotiation
in normative multiagent systems. In contract negotiation agents create new regulative and
constitutive norms in a legal context7 and in negotiation of obligation distribution a group
of agents negotiates how to distribute a joint task.5 These other kinds of negotiation are not
based on a social delegation cycle, and therefore give other powers to the agents.
Norm negotiation is related to the problem how a group obligation together with a group
sanction can be distributed among the members of the group. In particular, negotiation
of obligation distribution5 is analogous to the second step of the social delegation cycle,
extended with a penalty (pi) for the agent who breaks the negotiations (which may depend
on the agent, e.g., older boys may be punished harder for breaking negotiations than the
younger ones). The model distinguishes among three types of sanctions:
• the sanction associated with the group obligation, which is imposed when the obliga-
tion is violated, regardless which agent is responsible for it;
• the sanctions associated with the negotiated deal, which are imposed if one of the
agents does not fulfill its part of the deal;
• the sanctions associated with the break penalty pi.
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Moreover, the negotiation is driven by fear of a group sanction, including the sanction
for breaking the negotiation. In the model of norm negotiation developed in this paper, the
negotiation is driven by the agents’ desires. Agents are cooperative in the sense that they
have a social goal to achieve.
In some cases it is a drawback to be the only agent able to see to the fulfilment of part
of an obligation, but in other cases it may be an advantage, because of the power it gives
to the agent over the other agents during the negotiation. This is illustrated by a backward
induction argument.
9.3. Contract negotiation
As the philosopher of law Ruiter30 shows, from the legal point of view, legal effects of
actions of the members of a legal system are complex and contracts do not concern only
the regulative aspects of a legislation (i.e., the rules of behavior specified by obligations),
or the constitutive part of it (i.e., the rules introducing institutional facts such bidding in an
auction). Rather, contracts are legal institutions: “systems of [regulative and constitutive]
rules that provide frameworks for social action within larger rule-governed settings”.30 In
our model of contract negotiation games,7 the larger setting is represented by a normative
system which establishes the set of possible contracts.
Contract negotiation concerns only two or a few other agents, and therefore there is no
need for the three phases of the social delegation cycle, and in particular there is no social
goal. Moreover, there is the additional problem not present in social norm negotiation about
the choice of contract partners. This choice of contract partners gives a lot of power to
agents who have unique or rare abilities. The social delegation cycle however suggests that
the powers of agents are less important. In social goal generation, the situation is symmetric
for all agents. Only in norm negotiation, like in negotiation of obligation distribution, the
powers of agents may be a strategic advantage (or disadvantage!).
9.4. Normative system as an agent
In our other work we discuss also applications of normative multiagent systems.7,8 In those
papers the agents consider the normative system as an agent, and they attribute mental
attitudes to it, because the agents are playing games with the normative system to determine
whether to fulfill or violate norms. We refer to this use of the agent metaphor as “your wish
is my command”: the goals of the normative agent are the obligations of the normal agents.
As an agent with goals, the normative system has to decide whether to consider behavior
as a violation and to sanction violations.
In the present paper, however, the agents play games with other agents, and the attribu-
tion of mental attitudes to normative system is not a necessary assumption. We thus abstract
from the role of the normative system in recognizing violations and sanctioning them: here
we assume that violations and sanctions are a direct consequence of the behavior of the
agents.
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10. Further research
10.1. Mechanisms
Within the proposed general model of the social delegation cycle, actual procedures can be
defined and studied. In this paper, we propose a fairly general formal model of the social
delegation cycle, which delimits the kind of norms that can be created, but that does not
give an actual procedure to create norms. The reason is that we aim to capture the funda-
mental properties of the social delegation cycle, which later can be used to design actual
procedures. However, compared to informal characterizations of the construction of social
reality, such as in the work of Searle32, our model is fairly limited as we do not introduce
for example beliefs or institutions. Desirable properties may be soundness (compliance
with our framework), completeness (for each possible goal there is a goal generated), con-
ciseness of goals and norms generated, generality of goals and norms generated, strictness
of goal generation and norm creation, etc.
10.2. Balancing goal negotiation, norm negotiation and acceptance
We define three steps in the social delegation cycle, i.e., goal negotiation, norm negotiation
and acceptance, which do not have to be done sequentially but also can be done iteratively.
Moreover, norm negotiation could have been split into obligation negotiation and sanc-
tion negotiation. We have not formalized how the elements of the social delegation cycle
are balanced. For example, strictly defined norm creation procedures only create norms
that will always be accepted, and analogously strictly defined goal generation procedures
generate only goals for which a norm can be created that is accepted.
10.3. Trust
For more realistic but also more complex social trust, we have to enrich the model with
beliefs. We have to extend the merging operators to merging in the context of beliefs.15
Consequently, we have to introduce beliefs in norm creation, and we have to make the
acceptance relation relative to beliefs.
10.4. The negotiation of permissive norms
It is not directly clear how the social delegation cycle can explain the creation of permis-
sive norms. One way to proceed is to define permissions as exceptions within hierarchical
normative systems.11 However, also other kinds of permissions have been proposed,27 and
it is unclear which kind of permission should be used in the social delegation cycle.
10.5. Social institutions and the negotiation of constitutive norms
How to take social institutions into account in the social delegation cycle? Based on Searle’s
construction of social reality, we may introduce besides the obligations or regulative norms
also constitutive norms, which are definitions of the normative system based on a counts-as
conditional.7
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11. Summary
The social delegation cycle gives cognitive foundations to a social phenomenon, as it re-
lates agent desires to the norms of the society. Individual agents have desires, which turn
into social (or joint) goals. A social goal is individualized by a social norm. The individual
agents accept the norm, together with its associated sanctions and rewards, because they
recognize that it serves to achieve their desires the cycle started with. The cycle thus ex-
plains the creation of norms from desires from a rational perspective, because norms are
only accepted if they are respected by the other agents, which explains also why some-
times sanctions are needed. In this sense we explain norms in the tradition of Kant, who
emphasized the rational aspects of norms.
The social delegation cycle may be seen as a generalization of single agent decision
making, in which also the two steps of deriving goals and deriving plans for goals can
be distinguished. For example, in the BOID architecture10 there are components for goal
generation and for goal-based planning. Additional issues in the social delegation cycle
are the role of sanctions and rewards, the acceptance relation, and the implicit assumption
of fairness in goal and norm negotiation. Moreover, though we have not considered this
extension in this paper, in the social delegation cycle institutions may play a role. Sanctions
may be interpreted either as cues that the other agents see to their task, or as decommitment
possibilities for the agents themselves.31,35 In some cases sanctions must be associated
with the norms to ensure that agents fulfill the norm, and therefore to ensure that the agents
accept the norm, but in some other cases this is not necessary.
The two following prototypical examples of coordination games and prisoner’s
dilemma can be represented in our model.4 First, agents do not want to crash into each
other, and the norm to drive on the right side of the road (or the left side, for that mat-
ter) is accepted by all members. In this coordination game, no sanction is necessary and
the norm may be called a convention. Second, agents want to cooperate in a prisoner’s
dilemma, so the norm to cooperate is accepted by all members. In this case, a sanction
must be associated with the norm, because otherwise the agent will defect (as game theory
shows). In this paper we discuss a more complicated example in which there are various
kinds of agents, each capable to perform various kinds of task, and they have to negotiate
which tasks the group will perform (social goal), and which agents perform which task (the
norm). Sanctions are added to avoid free riding.
We formalize the social delegation cycle combining theories developed in a generaliza-
tion of belief revision called merging operators, planning and game theory. First, we for-
malize allowed proposals in social goal negotiation as a merging process of the individual
agent desires, for which we extend existing merging operators to deal with rules. Second,
we formalize allowed proposals in norm negotiation as a planning process for both the
obligation and the associated sanctions or rewards. Third, we formalize the acceptance re-
lation as both a belief of agents that the norm leads to achievement of their desires, and the
belief that other agents will act according to the norm, introducing a notion of normative
equilibrium which states that agents fulfill norms when other agents do so.
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